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Merging Innovation into Antitrust
Agency Enforcement of
the Clayton Act
Richard J. Gilbert* and Hillary Greene**
ABSTRACT

The treatment of innovation within the merger context by U.S. Antitrust
Agencies continues to evolve, with regard to both general statements of enforcement policy and specific enforcement decisions. The respective merger
guidelines issued by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission did not considerpotential impacts on innovation or research and development until 1982, and then only in passing. By contrast, their joint 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines devote an entire section to innovation issues.
This Essay examines both the frequency and manner with which the Antitrust
Agencies invoke innovation-based concerns within their respective merger
challenges from 2004-2014. It finds that both the DOJ and FTC allege adverse innovation effects in a very largefraction of their respective merger challenges in high-R&D-intensity industries. After exploring possible
explanations, the Essay recommends that the Agencies describe their innovation concerns with greater specificity when merger challenges allege harm to
innovation.
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INTRODUCTION

The Sherman Act' and the Clayton Act 2 are the Ten Commandments of U.S. antitrust law. Like the Ten Commandments, they describe in very general terms what parties "shall not do," and they have
their origins in a time when the world was very different than it is
today. Many of the industries that power today's economy did not
exist when Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914 and could not
even have been anticipated. There was no Internet. A social network
was a neighborhood. The microchip or its predecessor, the transistor,
had not been invented, and it was two decades before Alan Turing
would develop the concept of the modern computing machine.3 Other
industries that provide products and services that are critical to the
modern economy were in their infancy in 1914. The first Model T
automobile had rolled off one of the first automated assembly lines
only six years earlier.4 It was only a decade since the Wright Brothers'
first flight.5 The vacuum tube amplifier had been invented only eight
1 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012).
2 Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2012).
3 See Andrew Hodges, Computer Science: Beyond Turing's Machines, Sci., Apr. 2012, at
163, 163; Walter Isaacson, Microchips: The Transistor Was the First Step, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS
(Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-12-04/microchips-the-transistor-wasthe-first-step.
4 See Ford'sFamous Model TAutomobile Chugged into History in 1908, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
17, 1963, at E4.
5 See Stephen E. Massengill, "By Dauntless Resolution and Unconquerable Faith": Selected Anniversary Celebrationsat the Site of the Wright Brothers' First Flight, 1928-1978, 80 N.C.
HIsT. REV. 405, 405 (2003).
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years earlier, 6 and Thomas Edison had only recently demonstrated the
first talking motion picture.7
"Innovation" is defined as "something new or different introduced." 8 Antitrust has long acknowledged the importance of innovation but has struggled to incorporate it within the contours of its
analyses. Perhaps nowhere is this effort more apparent than with regard to mergers. This Essay explores the U.S. Antitrust Agencies'
evolution in their treatment of "innovation" under section 7 of the
Clayton Act as expressed in their enforcement policy guidelines and
as implemented in their actual enforcement records.
Part I briefly introduces the seminal positions, as exemplified by
Joseph A. Schumpeter and Kenneth J. Arrow, regarding the key relationships among innovation, market structure, and competition. Although the effects of market structure and competitive conditions on
incentives to innovate are complex, economic theory supports a conclusion that mergers may reduce incentives for innovation in some circumstances while increasing incentives for innovation in other
circumstances. Part II discusses the treatment of innovation in the
Agencies' variously promulgated enforcement guidelines and identifies key industry attributes that should affect the relationship between
competition and innovation. Part III reviews the enforcement history
of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division ("DOJ") and the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") regarding mergers that may have
affected innovation in the eleven-year period between 2004 and 2014.
Since 2004, the Agencies have identified innovation concerns in
approximately one-third of their merger challenges. 9 A fraction of
these mergers occurred in industries characterized by relatively high
research and development ("R&D") intensity, as measured by the ratios of R&D expenditures to sales or R&D expenditures per worker.
to Within the context of challenged mergers in highly R&D-intensive
6 See Lee De Forest, The Audion-Detectorand Amplifier, 12 PROC. INST. RADIO ENGINEERS, Mar. 1914, at 15, reprintedin 86 PROC. INST. ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS

1881 (1998).
7 See Motion Pictures, THE THOMAS A. EDISON PAPERS, http://edison.rutgers.edu/pic-

tures.htm (last updated Feb. 20, 2012).
8 RANDOM HOUSE DicTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 984 (2d ed. 1987). Some
define "invention" as the creation of a new product or process and "innovation" as an improvement of or significant contribution to an existing product or process. See, e.g., Tom Grasty, The
Difference Between "Invention" and "Innovation," IDEA LAB (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.pbs
.org/idealab/2012/03/the-difference-between-invention-and-innovationO86/. This Essay refers to
an inventor as an entity that creates an innovation, but otherwise uses the terms interchangeably.
9 See infra Part IlIl.A.
10 See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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industries, the Agencies identified innovation concerns in nearly all of
their merger challenges. This observation regarding the frequency of
innovation concerns raised within mergers in high technology industries may indicate the Agencies are adept at challenging only mergers
in contexts that are likely to harm innovation. However, some mergers in high-R&D-intensity industries may warrant a challenge for
static welfare harms but not support an allegation of harm to innovation. That would be the case if the merger is unlikely to harm innovation or if the merger may promote innovation, but the benefit is
unverified or not sufficient to compensate for likely price increases.
Part IV offers some tentative observations, using the 2010 Merger
Guidelines as a primary point of reference, regarding how the Agencies can better address innovation-based concerns under section 7 of
the Clayton Act.

I.

PERSPECTIVES ON INNOVATION, MARKET POWER,
AND COMPETITION

Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes mergers "in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the
country, [for which] the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."" Its enforcement largely has focused on what constitutes "a substantial lessening
of competition."1 2 The generally accepted view is that this phrase refers to an increase in market concentration that facilitates the use of
market power to raise the (quality-adjusted) price of a good or service.13 However, price is but one dimension of competition, and it is
not necessarily the dimension that most affects consumer welfare.
Innovation is a critical dimension of market performance. The
impact on consumers from new products and services has far exceeded the impact from price changes in numerous markets. 14 What
has been more important for consumer welfare: the development of
the modern smartphone or the fact that the smartphone has a retail
price of $400 rather than $450? New production methods have delivered enormous benefits in many industries. Modern microprocessors
11 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
12 See, e.g., United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 81 (D.D.C. 2011).
13 See id.; Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 Airm.
TRUST L.J. 1, 6-7 (2007).
14 See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 13, at 3 ("[C]ommentary has criticized enforcement
policy toward mergers and acquisitions for attempting to preserve short-run price competition
even when doing so has adverse effects on technological progress and even where innovation is
likely to ameliorate a merger's short-run harms to competition.").
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deliver over four million times the performance of Intel's 4004
microprocessor due to innovations in manufacturing and design.15 Between 1974 and 1996, the price of memory chips decreased by a factor
of 27,270 times, a rate of decline of 40.9% per year.1 6 Innovations in
methods to improve distribution services have led to lower prices and
enhanced consumer choice.17

Innovation has many determinants and ultimately relies on imagination and entrepreneurial spirit to translate ideas into market realities. Although the garage tinkerer and the absent-minded professor
are still vital components in the production of innovation, market incentives guide their efforts and the efforts of the large-scale establishments that invest in R&D. Competition is certainly not the sole driver
of innovation, but it is an important determinant of the incentive to
innovate. The reward of successful innovation and, therefore, the financial incentive to innovate is the difference in the profits that can be
earned with and without the invention. Competition affects both
parts of this equation. Furthermore, innovation also drives observed
market structures, as highly concentrated industries may reflect R&D
outcomes that have advantaged one or a few firms.18
Innovation-based effects can inform merger analysis in various
ways. Given that these effects are most often only alleged and not
fully litigated,19 questions regarding both the actual as well as appropriate, antitrust treatment only increase. A merger can positively or
negatively affect the incentive and the ability to innovate. Depending
upon the significance in absolute terms of those innovation-based effects (dynamic efficiency), as well as their significance relative to other
non-innovation-based competitive effects (static efficiency), innovation considerations play either a more central or more secondary role
in the antitrust analysis.
Joseph A. Schumpeter and Kenneth J. Arrow each provided seminal, albeit very different, perspectives on the relationship between inAndrew Danowitz et al., CPU DB: Recording Microprocessor History, 10 ACM
Apr. 2012, at 1, http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2181798.
16 Dale W. Jorgenson, Information Technology and the U.S. Economy, 91 AM. ECON. REV.
1, 3 (2001).
17 See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 13, at 2 ([W]hen firms invest in research and development . . . they can create valuable new products and reduce the costs of producing existing
products.").
18 See id. at 21-22.
19 See Steven C. Salop, Merger Settlement and Enforcement Policy for Optimal Deterrence
and Maximum Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2647 (2013) ("Merger enforcement today
relies on settlements more than litigation to resolve anticompetitive concerns.").
15

QUEUE,
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novation, market power, and competition. Schumpeter is credited as
among the earliest and the most influential advocates of the view that
size and market power can promote innovation. 2 0 For Schumpeter,
who observed the role of technical progress in promoting economic
growth in the early twentieth century, what mattered most is not price
"but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology,
the new source of supply." 21 He argued that sacrificing the short-term
benefits of pricing close to incremental costs that competitive markets
achieve in exchange for greater dynamic performance of less competitive markets can be an attractive trade for consumers and society.22
Schumpeter's market characterization supports innovation as an efficiency defense for mergers that might otherwise increase or enhance
market power, or that might facilitate its exercise.
Roughly three decades after Schumpeter's treatises, Kenneth Arrow showed that market power could lower incentives to innovate in
certain circumstances. 23 Consider two potential inventors striving to
develop a new product and assume that each will benefit the same
amount if she is successful. Further assume that one of the potential
inventors owns a firm with an existing product that generates profits
that the innovation would eliminate, while the other potential inventor has no corresponding profits at risk. Arrow showed that the profit
flow lowers the incremental benefit from an innovation relative to an
inventor that has no such profits at risk from the new product. 24
Moreover, to the extent that a reduction in competition would increase this profit flow, it would further decrease the incentive to
invent.
Arrow's conclusion that profits can dampen incentives for innovations that would displace those profits depends on many factors.
One factor is the implicit assumption that a new competitor can appropriate the benefits from innovation to no less an extent than an
existing firm. This circumstance would obtain if the inventor has
strong protection from imitation, for example from an effective patent, and can either fully exploit the innovation in-house or license the
20 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 578 (2007).
21

JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY

22

See id.

84 (3d ed. 1950).

Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
609,
619-20 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
24 Id. Jean Tirole has dubbed this the "replacement effect." JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 395-96 (1988).
23

THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE Acrivrry: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
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technology to others. Without such protection, an established firm
that accounts for a large fraction of sales in an industry may gain more
25
from innovation because it can more easily appropriate the benefits.
Existing profit flows also can have differential effects for investments
in processes and products. The incentive to invest in processes that
lower a firm's production cost is proportional to the firm's anticipated
sales with the new process. 26 Projected sales can be larger for an established firm than for a new competitor that has to build a market
presence. 27 New products can have different benefits for established
and new firms depending, inter alia, on the established firm's other
28
products and the scope for product differentiation. Furthermore, a
firm with market power can have incentives to invest in innovation to
preempt investment by competitors in order to maintain its market
power. 2 9

A firm's ability to appropriate the benefits of its R&D efforts is
30 Apcentral to Schumpeter's and Arrow's contrasting conclusions.
propriation is limited if firms can observe and easily imitate rivals'
innovations without compensating them. A merger can increase the
combined firm's ability to appropriate the benefits from innovation in
two ways. First, if the benefit from an innovation is proportional to
the scale of operations that employ the innovation, a merger can increase appropriation by increasing the size of the operations that
profit from the innovation. 31 Second, by increasing the merged firm's
market share, a merger can increase appropriation by reducing the
share of the market that may imitate the innovation without compen25 See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 23, at 622 (noting that "appropriability may be greater
under monopoly than under competition"); Jonathan B. Baker, Fringe Firms and Incentives to
Innovate, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 621, 622 (1995); Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger
Policy and Innovation: Must Enforcement Change to Account for Technological Change?, 5 INNOVATION PoL'v & ECON. 109, 131 (2005).
26 See Richard J. Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the CompetitionInnovation Debate?, 6 INNOVATION Pot'v & ECON. 159, 161-62 (2006).
27 See id.

&

28 See id.; Yongmin Chen & Marius Schwartz, Product Innovation Incentives: Monopoly vs.
Competition, 22 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 513, 513-14 (2013).
29 See Baker, supra note 25, at 634-35; Richard J. Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514, 514 (1982); Katz
Shelanski, supra note 25, at 131.
30 See generally Baker, supra note 20; Gilbert, supra note 26; Katz & Shelanski, supra note
25; Katz & Shelanski, supra note 13; Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit
the Bull's Eye?, in THE RATE AND DIRECrION OF INVENTIVE AcriviTY REVISITED 361 (Josh
Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2012); J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in
Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581 (2009).
31 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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sating the innovator. The first effect concerns a firm's ability to internalize the innovation's benefits within its own operations. The second
effect concerns a firm's ability to reduce technological spillovers that
would benefit its rivals and lower the profitability of innovation by
rendering the post-innovation market more competitive.
Weak appropriation supports the Schumpeterian view that size,
and, indirectly, market share, promotes incentives to innovate. In
contrast, if firms can appropriate the benefits from their innovations,
Arrow's conclusion applies, as profits from existing operations reduce
the net returns to innovation and the incentive to invest in R&D. 3 2
Appropriation is strong when innovations are protected by enforceable intellectual property rights. Alternatively, a firm may be able to
appropriate most of the benefits from an innovation if it is a major
discovery that allows the firm to capture most of the sales in the industry and the firm can maintain secrecy to avoid imitation. The conditions that affect a firm's ability to appropriate the benefits from its
investments in R&D differ among industries and technologies and
support different predictions regarding a merger's likely effects on incentives to innovate.
II.

ANTITRUST AGENCIES' POLICY STATEMENTS
REGARDING INNOVATION

Although the Antitrust Agencies first promulgated merger guidelines during the mid-1960s, 3 3 innovation would not be explicitly referenced within the guidelines until their revision in 1992, and even then
only in a footnote. 3 4 Innovation would not receive meaningful treatment within the merger guidelines until 2010.35 To fully appreciate the
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A. See generally Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The
Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse,48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2006) (discussing the manner in which the merger guidelines have exerted increasing influence on judicial
rulings through a process of institutionalization).
34 See infra Part II.C; supra note 49 and accompanying text.
35 See infra Part II.D. Innovation has played part of a larger policy framework at the FTC.
On the FTC, see generally J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, FTC Consumer Protection
at 100: 1970s Redux or Protecting Markets to Protect Consumers?, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2157
(2015); Daniel A. Crane, Debunking Humphrey's Executor, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1835
(2015); Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Ilene Knable Gotts, Looking Ahead: The FTC's Role in Information Technology Markets, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1876 (2015); Andrew I. Gavil, The FTC's
Study and Advocacy Authority in Its Second Century: A Look Ahead, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1902 (2015); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015); David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Can't
Anyone Here Play This Game? Judging the FTC's Critics, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1948 (2015);
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, It's Time to Remove the "Mossified" Proceduresfor FTC Rulemaking, 83
32
33
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evolution of the Antitrust Agencies' treatment of innovation, it is also
necessary to understand their earlier merger guidelines, which did not
address innovation. Part II selectively traces the changes that occurred in the Agencies' merger guidelines from 1968 through 2010.
A.

Guidelines in the 1960s

The DOJ issued its first general statement of merger enforcement
policy in 196836 in connection with its role in enforcing Clayton Act,
section 7, "to preserve and promote market structures conducive to
competition."37 The 1968 Guidelines adopted the principle that DOJ
"seeks primarily to prevent mergers which change market structure in
a direction likely to create a power to behave noncompetitively in the
production and sale of any particular product." 8 The Guidelines further explained that "a concentrated market structure . . . tends to discourage vigorous price competition" and, conversely, tends to
"encourage" other "undesirable" conduct, including inefficient production methods. 39 The Guidelines do not identify conduct associated
with innovation despite its economic significance. The only reference
to technological change occurs within the context of market definition. 40 As such, the 1968 Guidelines do not focus on whether a change
in market structure affects innovation; rather, they only address
whether innovation might change the relevant market structure for
analysis of the transaction. 4 1
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1979 (2015); Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Weigh the Label, Not the Tractor:
What Goes on the Scale in an FTC Unfairness Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1999 (2015); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Rocky Relationship Between the Federal Trade Commission and Administrative Law, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2026 (2015); Edith Ramirez, A Framework for Promoting Competition and Protecting Consumers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2049
(2015); D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2064 (2015);
David C. Vladeck, Charting the Course: The Federal Trade Commission's Second Hundred
Years, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2101 (2015); Joshua D. Wright & John Yun, Stop Chug-a-lug-alugin 5 Miles an Hour on Your International Harvester: How Modern Economics Brings the
FTC's Unfairness Analysis Up to Speed with Digital Platforms, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2130
(2015).
36 Merger Guidelines 1968, reprintedin 4 TRADE REG. REP.
.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.htm.
37 Id. § 2.
38 Id. § 3(i).
39 Id. § 2.
40

1

13,101 (2004), www.justice

Id.

41 See id. The Guidelines state that in "exceptional circumstances" structural factors will
not necessarily be conclusive. An example of such a case might be "where basic technological
changes are creating new industries, or are significantly transforming older industries, in such
fashion as to make current market boundaries and market structure of uncertain significance."
Id.

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

1928

B.

[Vol. 83:1919

Guidelines in the 1980s

The DOJ's 1982 revision of the horizontal merger guidelines continued the 1968 Guidelines' emphasis on market structure and established as its lodestar "that mergers should not be permitted to create
or enhance 'market power' or to facilitate its exercise."4 2 Market
power was defined as the "ability of one or more firms profitably to
maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of
time."4 3 While the 1982 Guidelines nominally recognized that
"[s]ellers with market power also may eliminate rivalry on variables
other than price,"" such non-price competition received little further
elaboration.45 Discussion of the potential significance of technological
change is very narrowly circumscribed. The Guidelines simply note
that rapid technological change may complicate the use of a single
price to analyze markets and effects on competition.46
The 1982 Guidelines were revised just two years later. Most significantly for efforts to understand innovation as an element of
merger policy, the 1984 Guidelines expanded the possible role for efficiencies as a defense-i.e., a mitigating factor-when assessing a
merger's anticompetitive effect.4 7 As such, the 1984 Guidelines of-

fered a narrow avenue through which increased innovation could be
argued as a procompetitive effect weighing in favor of a proposed
merger transaction.
C

Guidelines in the 1990s

The first reference to innovation in Agency merger guidelines occurred in their 1992 revision. 4 8 This development, albeit modest, came
nearly eighty years after the Clayton Act was enacted. It took the
form of a footnote that stated: "Sellers with market power also may
lessen competition on dimensions other than price, such as product
quality, service, or innovation."49 In other respects the 1992 Guidelines continued to emphasize a transaction's ability to create or en42 Merger Guidelines 1982, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG.
§ I, http://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1982-merger-guidelines.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45

REP.,

supra note 36, at

1

13,102,

See id.

See id. § III(C)(1)(a) n.36.
See Merger Guidelines 1984, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP., supra note 36, at
¶ 13,103, § 3.4, http://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1984-merger-guidelines.
48 Merger Guidelines 1992, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP., supra note 36, at ¶
13,104,
§ 4, http://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-0.
49 Id. § 0.1 n.6.
46
47
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hance market power (defined by the ability to raise price) or to
facilitate its exercise as the key determinant in merger evaluations. 5 0
In 1997 the Agencies issued revised guidelines that expanded their
treatment of efficiencies. 5 ' For the first time, the Guidelines explicitly
acknowledged that a merger could benefit consumers by enhancing
the merged firm's incentive to develop new or improved products, i.e.,
to be a better innovator. 52 However, the Guidelines added the qualifications that "certain types of efficiencies are more likely to be cognizable and substantial than others" and that efficiencies related to
R&D "are potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible to
verification and may be the result of anticompetitive output
reductions." 53
Sophisticated thinking about innovation and merger effects
emerged within the Agencies during the early-to-mid-1990s. By way
of example, in a 1993 article, Innovation Issues Under the 1992 Merger
Guidelines, then-FTC Commissioner Dennis A. Yao and Attorney
Advisor Susan S. DeSanti clearly delineated "the need" and "the difficulties" associated with assessing innovation within the merger context. 54 They then elaborated upon innovation's specific "implications
for competitive effects analysis."55 The Agencies themselves adopted
more comprehensive policies regarding innovation just a few years
later, albeit in a nonmerger context, in their jointly issued 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property ("IP
Guidelines").5 6

These developments notwithstanding, the merger guidelines issued in 1992 and 1997 did little more than acknowledge the potential
of a merger to harm or benefit innovation.57 The cursory treatment of
innovation concerns was broadly consistent with Agency decisions at
the time. Richard J. Gilbert and Willard K. Tom analyzed the DOJ
and FTC merger challenges throughout the 1990s. 5 8 From 1990
See id. § 0.1.
Merger Guidelines 1997, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP., supra note 36, at I 13,104,
http://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1997-merger-guidelines.
52 Id. § 4.
53 Id.
54 See Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Innovation Issues Under the 1992 Merger
Guidelines, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 505, 506-09 (1993).
55 Id. at 513.
56 Intellectual Property Guidelines 1995, reprintedin 4 TRADE REG. REP., supra note 36,
at ¶ 13,132, http://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-guidelines-licensing-intellectual-property.
57 See supra notes 49, 52 and accompanying text.
58 See Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies?
The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 43 (2001).
50

51
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through 1994, the Agencies cited innovation-based concerns "in only
four cases" when challenging a merger, a figure that amounts to only
3% of the cases. 59 In contrast, over the course of the next five years,
innovation concerns characterized 17.5% of the Agencies' merger
challenges, 60 but Gilbert and Tom found that "innovation concerns
were decisive in only a few cases." 6 1 They, however, hastened to add
that even in those cases in which innovation was raised but not dispositive, one could not conclude that "innovation impacts were
unimportant."62
D.

Guidelines in 2010

Another dozen years passed before the next revision of the
Guidelines. The 2010 Guidelines both explicitly and prominently address innovation for the first time. 63 They mention innovation no
fewer than nineteen times, both in the context of potential anticompetitive harms (potential decrease in innovation) and as a potential
procompetitive effect in the form of an efficiency defense (potential
increase in innovation).6 4 These latest guidelines also acknowledge
that adverse effects on innovation may occur with or without simultaneous adverse price effects. 65
Of particular interest in the 2010 Guidelines is the section titled
"Innovation and Product Variety," which contains two significant assertions. 6 6 The first is that "[c]ompetition often spurs firms to innovate." 67 The second is that a merger may harm innovation "by
encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the
level that would prevail in the absence of the merger." 68 The former
quotation reflects the presumption that competition and innovation
are often intertwined. The latter quotation recognizes the relationship
between a change in market structure accompanying a merger and the
merged firm's incentive to innovate. The Guidelines explain that diminished innovation could entail "reduced incentive to continue with
an existing product-development effort or reduced incentive to initi59 Id. at 49.
60
61
62

Id.
Id. at 44.
Id.

63 Merger Guidelines 2010, reprinted in 10 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 113,100, http://www
.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf [hereinafter Merger Guidelines 2010].
64 See id. §§ 1, 6, 6.4, 10.
65 Id. § 6.4.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
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ate development of new products." 69 More specifically, they attribute
the diminished incentive to initiate new product development to a
"longer-run effect" that is "most likely to occur if at least one of the
merging firms has capabilities that are likely to lead it to develop new
products in the future that would capture substantial revenues from
the other merging firm."7 0
The 2010 Guidelines observe the importance of appropriation as
a determinant of a merger's effect on innovation:
When evaluating the effects of a merger on innovation, the
Agencies consider the ability of the merged firm to conduct
research or development more effectively. . .. The Agencies
also consider the ability of the merged firm to appropriate a
greater fraction of the benefits resulting from its innovations.
Licensing and intellectual property conditions may be important to this enquiry, as they affect the ability of a firm to
appropriate the benefits of its innovation.7
Nonetheless, the 2010 Guidelines also note, "[r]esearch and development cost savings may be substantial and yet not be cognizable
efficiencies because they are difficult to verify or result from anticompetitive reductions in innovative activities." 7 2 Importantly, the 2010
Guidelines do not provide additional detail to reconcile their stated
reluctance to consider R&D cost savings as cognizable efficiencies
with their recognition of the potential R&D benefits from the ability
of the merged firm to appropriate a greater fraction of the gains from
its innovations.
In order to better understand how the Agencies have dealt with
innovation concerns, Part III presents empirical evidence regarding
the frequency of innovation challenges by the Agencies and the characteristics of the industries in which these challenges have occurred.

III.

ANTITRUST AGENCIES' ENFORCEMENT RECORDS
REGARDING INNOVATION

As Part II explained, the Guidelines issued by the U.S. Antitrust
Agencies describing their merger enforcement methodologies have
changed dramatically in their treatment of innovation. The first
guidelines failed to acknowledge any role for innovation either as a
potential adverse competitive effect or as a possible efficiency de69 Id.
70 Id.

71 Id. § 10.
72 Id.
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fense.73 Over the past two decades, the subsequent guidelines evolved
from a brief statement limiting innovation to a subset of non-price
competitive effects to providing a prominent place for innovation in
the 2010 Merger Guidelines. Part III reviews the recent record of
merger enforcement actions by the DOJ and FTC with a focus on the
frequency and manner with which they allege innovation harms.
A.

The Frequency of Innovation-Related Challenges

Although the concept of innovation embraces a wide range of
activities that influence the development of new products, services, or
cost-reducing methods, this Essay employs a literal definition to identify enforcement actions that involve innovation. A matter is identified as raising innovation-based concerns if it explicitly uses the term
"innovation" or "research and development" to describe, within select
public documents, the marketplace or the competitive effects. One of
the practical consequences associated with this definition is that it excludes mergers covering a swath of industries for which the Agencies
describe the competitive effects solely in terms of "product development" or "product design," an issue addressed below.
We identified the universe of mergers for which the FTC or DOJ
filed a complaint during the eleven-year period of 2004 through
2014.74 Proposed mergers that the parties abandoned prior to the filing of a complaint were excluded. The small number of proposed
mergers that were abandoned after a complaint was filed were included in this analysis. Although the universe includes numerous litigated mergers, most were resolved with consent agreements that were
filed concurrently with the complaints.
Application of the foregoing criteria yielded 250 challenged
mergers. For each of these matters, we analyzed the FTC or the
DOJ's complaint as well as, whenever available, the FTC's Analysis to
Aid Public Comment or the DOT's Competitive Impact Statement.
The Agencies file these documents (collectively referred to as
"merger documents") for public comment prior to entering into a conSee supra Part IIA-C.
Data on mergers from 2008 to 2014 was derived, in part, from Market Federal Merger
Enforcement Actions Summaries published by Thomson Reuters. The authors collected data
for 2004 to 2007 from published complaints and other Agency documents. The DOJ and the
FTC websites provide the relevant merger documents. See generally Antitrust Case Filings, U.S.
DEP'T JUST., www.justice.gov/atr/cases/index.html#page=page-1 (last visited Oct. 27, 2015); Enforcement: Cases and Proceedings, FED. TRADE COMM'N, www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings (last visited Oct. 27, 2015).
73
74
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sent decree.7 5 For each matter we examined whether these documents
alleged, in strong or weak terms, that the merger implicated innovation or R&D.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics for the challenged
transactions. During this eleven-year period, the DOJ challenged approximately half as many mergers as did the FTC. The DOJ and FTC
raised innovation-based considerations within thirty and fifty-four
transactions, respectively. Both the DOJ and the FTC alleged harm
to innovation in about one-third of their merger challenges.
TABLE

1.

MERGER CHALLENGES:

2004-2014
Percent of Category
100%
65.6%

Number
Total # of Challenged Transactions
FTC Challenges
DOJ Challenges
Total # of Challenges Alleging Harm to

250
164

34.4%

86
84

33.6%
I

Innovation

FC Challenges Alleging Harm to
Innovation

54

32.9%*

DOJ Challenges Alleging Harm to

30

34.9%**

I
innovation
to
harm
allege
that
challenges
FTC
*Percentage of
**Percentage of DOJ challenges that allege harm to innovation
Innovation

This study uses statistics from the National Science Foundation
("NSF") 76 and the Brookings Institution ("Brookings")77 to classify inFor those matters in which the FTC issued an administrative complaint and also filed an
injunction or temporary restraining order in federal court, this Essay references the FTC administrative complaint. That stylistic convention does not influence the results. The FTC filed a
complaint within the U.S. district court system in addition to filing an administrative complaint
within the Agency itself in only 10 of the 164 FTC matters considered. 8 of those matters involved a complaint for a temporary restraining order, and 2 involved a complaint for a preliminary injunction alone. Additionally, the FTC filed a complaint only in federal court without
filing a corresponding administrative complaint in 3 matters.
Most important for instant purposes, the 3 district court complaints that raise innovation
considerations do so in a manner that is identical to their corresponding administrative complaints. The 3 matters are: FTC v. Ardagh Grp. S.A., No. 1:13-cv-01021-RMC (D.D.C. 2013);
FTC v. Graco Inc., No. 1:11-cv-02239-RLW (D.D.C. 2011-2012); and FTC v. OSF Healthcare
Sys., No. 3:11-cv-50344 (N.D. Ill. 2011-2012). Moreover, none of the district court complaints
omit innovation issues that were raised in the corresponding administrative complaint and none
of the complaints lodged solely within the district courts raised innovation considerations. See
generally 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2012) (delineating circumstances under which the FTC can pursue a
temporary restraining orders, or preliminary injunction, prior to filing an administrative
75

complaint).
76

NAT'L

Sci.

FOUND., Div. oF Sci. RES. STATISTICS, SURVEY OF INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH
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dustry sectors into three levels of R&D intensity, here labeled low,
moderate, and high. The Appendix lists the industry sectors in each
category.78 NSF and Brookings employ different metrics for different
time periods. The NSF data are R&D expenditures as a fraction of
sales for 2003-2007, and the Brookings data are R&D expenditures
per worker for 2009. The two data sets sometimes yield different
R&D intensity rankings for the same industry, and in other cases the
industry classifications encompass broad economic sectors that include subsectors with different R&D intensities. Subjective assignments were necessary for a few sectors for which the data sources
were not consistent or industry sectors were not reported at a sufficient level of detail. 79
Our search algorithm does not always clearly identify innovation
concerns in merger challenges because the Agencies do not always use
the terms "innovation" or "research and development" to describe
their concerns about mergers that might affect the supply of new or
improved products or services. In some cases the Agencies refer to
harm to product "development" or "design" without specifically mentioning innovation or R&D. The search algorithm excludes these
other terms out of concern about casting an overbroad net that might
ensnare merger challenges that do not involve innovation or R&D.80
It, nonetheless, is instructive to examine certain isolated examples in
order to consider how they might affect the conclusions of this study,
which we do below.
In addition to industry R&D intensity, this analysis used other
data from the relevant merger documents regarding the parties and
the industries that the proposed transaction affected. These data inAND DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS

2010, Appendix Table 4-14, http://

www.nsf.gov/statistics/seindl0/append/c4/at04-14.pdf.
77 MARK MURO ET AL., BROOKINGS ADVANCED INDUS. PROJECT, AMERICA'S ADVANCED
INDUSTRIES: WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY ARE, AND WHY THEY MATTER 21 (2015), http://

www.brookings.edu//media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/02/03-advanced-industries/final/AdvancedlndustryFinalFeb2lores.pdf?la=en.
78 A description of the data and the algorithms for classifying industries is on file with the
authors.
79 Industry sectors requiring such subjective assignments include "generic pharmaceuticals," "oil and gas retailing, transport, and storage," and "media, broadcasting, and entertainment," all assigned to low R&D intensity, and "genetically modified organisms," assigned to
high R&D intensity. In a few cases the two sources classify the same industry as having different
R&D intensities. In those instances, this Essay uses only the most R&D-intensive classification.
See infra Appendix.
80 Note that the determination of whether innovation harm is alleged is complicated by
what constitutes an innovation. For example, minor changes to assembly processes or minor
product improvements may or may not be identified as potential innovations.
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clude the transaction size, whether unilateral or coordinated competitive effects were alleged, whether the transaction excluded a potential
entrant, whether the transaction had a vertical component, and the
market concentration or number of significant competitors for each
market identified in the complaint or other public document. We conducted a probit regression that related the probability that the Agencies allege harm to innovation in their merger challenges to these
industry and market characteristics. With the exception of industry
R&D intensity, none of these variables was related to the probability
of an innovation allegation with a high degree of statistical confidence.
In particular, allegations of innovation harm were not more likely in
mergers that were larger, mergers in more concentrated industries, or
81
mergers involving the exclusion of potential entrants.
Table 2 shows the percentage of merger challenges that allege
harm to innovation for the DOJ and FTC collectively and for each
Agency separately, categorized according to the R&D intensity of the
affected industry. For the DOJ and FTC combined, merger challenges that invoked innovation considerations occurred almost five
times as often in moderately R&D-intensive industries as compared
with challenges in industries with low R&D intensity (44.2% versus
9.0%). In industries with high R&D intensity, merger challenges that
allege innovation occurred more than nine times as often as compared
with challenges in industries with low R&D intensity (82.5% versus
9.0%). As Table 2 highlights, both the DOJ and FTC allege harm to
innovation in a very high percentage of merger challenges in industries that this analysis classifies as having high R&D intensity.
TABLE

2.

FRACTION OF AGENCY MERGER CHALLENGES THAT
ALLEGE HARM TO INNOVATION

FTC + DOJ
FFC
DOJ

2004-2014

Low R&D

Moderate R&D

High R&D

Intensity

Intensity

Intensity

9.0%
6.0%
13.3%

44.2%
32.4%
88.9%

82.5%
82.6%
82.4%

Both the harm to innovation from a merger and the potential for
a change in industry structure to promote innovation-and therefore
create a merger-specific efficiency-are most likely to occur in industries with high R&D intensity. In all but three mergers that the DOJ
81 The regression results are on file with the authors.
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challenged in industries identified as high R&D intensity, the search
algorithm also revealed that the DOJ alleged that these mergers, if
consummated without conditions, would harm innovation. It is instructive to examine more closely these three outliers. 82
The DOJ challenged Cengage Learning, Inc.'s proposed acquisition of Houghton Mifflin College Division's assets.8 3 The product
market was the "development, publication, and sale of textbooks and
ancillary . . . materials" for use in courses taught at higher education
institutions throughout the United States.84 This product market corresponds to "publishing," which the NSF classified as having relatively
high R&D intensity.5 If, instead, textbook publishing were classified
as having moderate- or low-R&D-intensity,86 the fraction of merger
challenges in high-R&D-intensity industries for which the DOJ raised
innovation concerns would increase to nearly eighty-eight percent (14/
16).
There were two other mergers that the DOJ challenged in highly
R&D-intensive industries for which the search algorithm did not identify innovation concerns. These were United States v. General Electric
8 In
Co. 8 7 and United States v. Microsemi Corp.*
the former, the DOJ
raised concerns about "development, manufacture, and sale of [lowspeed synchronous electric motors]"89 and in the latter the "develop82 In addition to possible false negatives, our algorithm may also generate possible false
positives. A small subset of the high-R&D-intensity matters in which the relevant product market is defined as including "research, development" as well as "manufacture, sale" are coded as
innovation, but do not include any explicit reference to "innovation" or harm to "research and
development" and, therefore, might not actually involve innovation. See In re Eli Lilly & Co.,
FTC File No. 141-0142, 2014 WL 7330499, at *1-2 (F.T.C. Dec. 19, 2014) (complaint); In re
Novartis AG, 150 F.T.C. 281, 283 (2010); In re Allergan, 141 F.T.C. 165, 167 (2006). Furthermore, it is also possible that some industries classified as having low or moderate R&D intensity
might more properly be considered as having high R&D intensity.
83 Complaint, United States v. Cengage Learning Holdings, No. 1:08-cv-00899, 2008 WL
5448236 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2008).
84 Id. at 2.
85 NAT'L Sci. FOUND., supra note 76.
86 Brookings's "software publishers" category has relatively high R&D intensity. Brookings has no separate category for "publishers." See MurO ET AL., supra note 77, at 21. It is
possible that the NSF category "publishers" includes software and other digital technologies that
have relatively high R&D intensity. If the datasets employed more granular categories in the
"publishers" field, considering publication of hard-copy textbooks as distinct from digital publishing technologies, they might well identify textbook publishing as low or moderate in R&D
intensity.
87 Complaint, United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 1:11-cv-01549 (D.D.C. Aug.
29, 2011).
88 Verified Complaint, United States v. Microsemi Corp., No. 1:08-cv-1311 (E.D.
Va. Dec.
18, 2008).
89 Complaint, supra note 87, at 10.
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Although
ment, manufacture and sale" of transistors and diodes.
not highlighted by the search algorithm, these statements suggest con91
cerns about harms related to product innovation.

If one reclassified these three cases for the foregoing reasons and
the balance of the cases are correctly analyzed with regard to both the
presence of an alleged harm to innovation and the designation of
R&D intensity, then one would conclude that the DOJ raised innovation concerns in 100% of the mergers that it challenged in high-R&Dintensity industries.

According to this Essay's classification of industry R&D intensity
and search algorithm to identify innovation concerns, the FTC did not
raise innovation concerns when challenging eight mergers in highR&D-intensity industries. 9 2 If one reexamined these eight merger
challenges to assess whether they raised possible innovation concerns
that escaped our algorithm, it would not be unreasonable to conclude
that a substantial fraction of these cases involved innovation harms
such as harm to "product development," leading to the conclusion
that the FTC raised innovation concerns in approximately ninety percent of the mergers that the Agency challenged in highly R&D-intensive industries.
The differences in the respective fractions of challenged mergers

for which the DOJ and FTC alleged harm to innovation, as indicated
in Table 2, need not necessarily indicate different enforcement pos90 Complaint, supra note 88, at 2.
91 These concerns likely address significant technological improvements to the products
considered in these matters. Otherwise, innovation harm could be linked to almost any product
involving some development, even when the innovation involved is relatively small. See supra
note 80.
92 The eight cases and the corresponding relevant product markets are: (1) Complaint,
Honeywell Int'l, Inc., File No. 131-0070 (F.T.C. Sept. 13, 2013) (2D scan engines); (2) Complaint,
Gen. Elec. Co., File No. 131-0069 (F.T.C. July 19, 2013) (gear boxes for jet engines); (3) Complaint, King Pharm., Inc. & Alpharma, Inc., File No. 081-0240 (F.T.C. Dec 29, 2008) (oral longacting opioid analgesics); (4) Complaint, CCC Holdings Inc., File No. 081-0155 (F.T.C. Nov. 25,
2008) (estimatics and total loss valuation systems markets); (5) Complaint, TALX Corp., File
No. 061-0209 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2008) (provision of outsourced employment verification services);
(6) Complaint, Hexion LLC & Huntsman Corp., File No. 071-0212 (F.T.C. Oct. 2, 2008) (specialty epoxy resins); (7) Complaint, Cephalon, Inc. & CIMA Labs, Inc., File No. 041-0025 (F.T.C.
Sept. 12, 2004) (prescription drug products for the treatment of breakthrough cancer pain);
(8) Complaint, Ovation Pharm., Inc., File No. 081-0156 (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 2008) (Indocin and
NeoProfen for the treatment of patent ductus arteriosus). Two cases involved drugs that were
about to go off patent (King and Cephalon). In two other cases the FTC alleged harm to product design or development (General Electric and Hexion). Furthermore, in an additional two
cases the product markets arguably could be classified as having moderate R&D intensity
(TALX and CCC Holdings).
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tures by the two agencies, as their industry portfolios differ.93 The
observation that the FTC alleges harm to innovation in a smaller percentage of mergers than the DOJ in industries classified as moderate
in R&D intensity could well reflect that more FTC-reviewed mergers
occur in industries that the NSF and Brookings classify as moderately
R&D-intensive, but are not viewed as such by the Agency. For example, for historical reasons and based on accumulated experience, a significant fraction of the FTC's merger-enforcement portfolio is in the
health care industry. 94 Both the NSF and Brookings classify "health
care services" as having moderate R&D intensity.9" Yet this classification, like a number of others, encompasses a very broad swath of activities, many of which are not R&D-intensive. Examples include
outpatient surgery services and inpatient services provided by hospitals that do little R&D.
By concentrating markets, mergers can either harm or promote
incentives for innovation.96 An increase in market power from a
merger can dull the incentive to invent in at least two ways. By increasing the flow of profits from existing products and services, the
merger can reduce the merged firm's incentive to create new products
and services. 97 Alternatively, the merger can combine two firms, each
of which would have taken significant sales from the other if they had
been successful innovators.98 The merger internalizes this externality,
thereby reducing incentives for invention.
Yet a merger also can increase incentives for innovation. Many
innovations create value that is largely specific to the firm that develops the innovation. A new process to lower production costs will create value that is proportional to the innovator's sales, unless the
innovator can license others at terms that reflect the lower costs enabled by the innovation.9 9 If licensing at compensatory terms is not
viable, a larger firm has a greater incentive to innovate because it has
more sales that can benefit from the innovation.10 0 A merger can enhance this type of innovation by enabling the merged firm to appro93 See How Mergers Are Reviewed, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/media-resources/mergers-and-competition/merger-review (last visited Oct. 27, 2015)
[hereinafter How Mergers Are Reviewed].
94 See Mary K. Marks & Beverly J. Ang, Agency Merger Enforcement in Non-Reportable
Transactions, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2010, at 1, 2.
95 NAT'L Sci. FOUND., supra note 76; MURO ET AL., supra note 77, at 21.
96 See supra Part I.
97 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
98 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
99 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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priate a larger share of the innovation's potential value. In a sense,
the merger partially solves the appropriation problem associated with
imperfect licensing.
Of course, the Agencies challenge only a fraction of the mergers
that they investigate.10 We do not observe the mergers that proceed
unchallenged because the Agencies recognize their procompetitive
benefits regarding innovation. These mergers do not appear in any
searchable database. Instead, what we observe are mergers that the
Agencies have challenged because they are likely to raise prices or
harm innovation, or both. It is possible that the Agencies only challenge a merger in a high-R&D-intensive industry if they conclude the
merger is likely to harm innovation. However, because not all mergers that are likely to raise prices also harm innovation, it should be the
case that some fraction of the observed challenges fall within industries for which adverse innovation effects are unlikely.
Nonetheless, both the DOJ and the FTC allege adverse innovation effects in a very large fraction of their respective merger chal02 Furthermore,
their
lenges in high-R&D-intensity industries.1
unstatistically
are
industries
of
types
all
across
innovation challenges
related to a set of reported characteristics (market concentration,
03
transaction size, etc.) of those industries other than R&D intensity.
Yet one would expect net merger benefits for innovation to be more
likely in some industries than in others, holding R&D intensity constant. Furthermore, there ought to be at least some mergers in which
significant harm to innovation is not likely.
The very high fraction of challenged mergers in high-R&D-intensity industries in which the Agencies allege harm to innovation, then,
invites further consideration. One explanation is that the Agencies
undervalue or inadequately consider innovation benefits that may
arise from a merger in such sectors. This explanation is consistent
with the lack of evidence from the probit regression analysis that relevant factors such as market concentration, transaction size, and concerns about coordinated anticompetitive effects correlate with
allegations of harm to innovation. Another possibility is that when
the Agencies predict a net benefit to innovation from a merger, the
predicted innovation benefit is highly weighted vis-A-vis any predicted
static consumer harm (at least in high-R&D-intensity industries). If,
in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, innovation benefits gener101 See How Mergers Are Reviewed, supra note 93.
102 See supra Table 2.
103 See supra text accompanying note 81.
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ally trump price effects, then the Agencies will not challenge the
merger and, therefore, proposed mergers involving a net positive benefit to innovation would not appear in the data regarding merger challenges.104 However, economic theory suggests that some mergers
should not present significant concerns about innovation, even if those
mergers occur in high-R&D-intensity industries.105 These mergers
may raise static concerns from higher prices, but should not also raise
concerns about dynamic effects. Hence, this is an incomplete explanation. In either case, as discussed in the next section, the Agencies
should provide greater clarity regarding their analysis of innovation
harms.1 0 6

B.

The Treatment of Innovation-Related Challenges

The central determination in our analysis is whether and under
what conditions the Agencies invoke harm to innovation within their
respective merger challenges. This Section provides some further insight regarding the heterogeneity characterizing the Agencies' invocation of innovation-based concerns. This Essay's binary treatment of
an innovation challenge does not address, for example, the level of
Agency concern. Assessing the level of concern, particularly from the
public documents at issue herein, is both a difficult and subjective
task. As such, we adopt a relatively simple approach that treats the
manner in which innovation is invoked as a noisy measure of the level
of concern.
We divided the eighty-four matters for which the Agencies have
alleged innovation concerns into two groups depending upon whether
the Agency's treatment of innovation, as defined by our search algorithm, takes the form of being mentioned or discussed. "Mentioned" describes a case in which the Agency directly states that a
decrease in competition will harm innovation but the Agency does not
provide further elaboration. This would include various circum104 In other antitrust contexts courts have treated innovation benefits quite favorably. See,
e.g., Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and Free Speech, 95
B.U. L. REV. 35, 79 (2015) (stating that as a practical matter in Sherman Act section 2 monopolization cases involving allegedly anticompetitive product redesign, "the existence of a nonpretextual innovation justification is sufficient to overcome claimed anticompetitive effects").
105 As previously discussed, mergers in industries with weak appropriation should not raise
significant innovation concerns. See supra notes 20-32, 99-100 and accompanying text. Furthermore, innovation concerns should be less likely when the alleged competitive effects take the
form of coordinated interactions because it is more difficult for firms to coordinate on research
and development expenditures.
106 When Agencies challenge mergers, it appears that, as a matter
of litigation strategy,
their complaints do not address procompetitive benefits other than to cursorily reject them.
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stances such as when an Agency notes that an acquisition will eliminate competition and "likely will result in higher prices and reduced
innovation"10 7 or when the Agency states that "eliminating . . competition . . . [for] research, development, manufacture, and sale . .
[would] reduc[e] existing incentives to improve product quality or to
pursue further innovation."1 0 8

"Discussed" describes instances when the Agency not only explicitly posits harm to innovation but also elaborates upon the contours or
nature of that harm.10 9 Such discussion frequently entails a more specific statement that the market at issue has benefited from innovation
spurred by competition.1 10 And a portion of those discussions often
specifically identifies the innovations that resulted from such competition and the likely harms that would occur from the proposed
transaction."'
Though less common, the nature of innovation is reflected in discussions regarding the mechanisms of innovation or distinctions
among firms' innovation capabilities. For example, one complaint
contained a subsection entitled, "How Competition Occurs," which
explained that producers "must engage in research and development
to deliver better. .. products in order to compete effectively." 112 Another complaint discussed how harm to innovation would arise, in
part, because "[i]t would be prohibitively expensive for many customers to develop a [product] with functionality comparable to the features offered by [the merging parties], and it would be difficult to
maintain the same pace of innovation."1 1 3
Figure 1 presents the summary statistics. The Agencies merely
mention innovation in roughly half of the challenges that raise innova107 In re Solera Holdings, Inc., FTC File No. 121-0165, 2013 WL 3830389, at *39 (F.T.C.
June 22, 2013) (analysis of proposed agreement).
108 Complaint, supra note 87, at 4.
109 The "discussed" category also includes "innovation market" arguments that address the
development of markets that do not yet exist. See In re Nielsen Holdings N.V., File No. 1310058, 2014 WL 869523, at *2-3 (F.T.C. Feb. 24, 2014) (complaint); Intellectual Property Guidelines 1995, supra note 56, § 3.2.3.
110 See, e.g., In re Hologic, Inc., File No. 051-0263, 2006 WL 2522714, at *3-4 (F.T.C. Aug.
9, 2006).
111 See, e.g., Complaint at 3, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.D.C. Aug.
31, 2011) ("[Ulnless this acquisition is enjoined, customers of mobile wireless telecommunications services likely will face higher prices, less product variety and innovation, and poorer quality services due to reduced incentives to invest than would exist absent the merger.").
112 Complaint at 9, United States v. Amcor Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-00973 (D.D.C. June 10,

2010).
113

2013).

Complaint at 12, United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10,
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tion concerns, and they discuss innovation effects in the remaining
matters (i.e., 46%, 58%, and 48% for low-, moderate-, and highR&D-intensity industries, respectively). These discussion rates do not
vary markedly across the three R&D intensity categories. As such,
the use of the binary indicator for an innovation challenge in this Essay's earlier analysis does not appear to mask a skewed pattern of
discussion about innovation effects that differs across R&D-level
categories.
FIGURE

1.

PERCENT OF INNOVATION MATTERS
THAT ARE "DISCUSSED"
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We also analyzed the data underlying Figure 1 to examine
whether the use of "research, development" within our search algorithm skewed the results regarding high-R&D-intensity industries
because "research, development" could be present in the merger documents at issue regardless of the existence of an innovation concern.
One interesting pattern that emerged is an apparent difference in
relative treatment by the Agencies. Conditional on an innovation
concern being raised within the documents at issue, on average DOJ
engages in a greater level of discussion than does the FTC. This difference is found across every level of R&D intensity. The Agencies
review different portfolios of industries and, therefore, this apparent
difference could be explained in part by a composition effect as was
discussed regarding the percentage of merger challenges involving innovation in Table 2.114 However, because DOJ has higher levels of
discussion across all R&D intensity categories, composition effects are
unlikely to fully explain this pattern. Instead, this pattern might suggest that DOJ substantively handles innovation somewhat differently
114 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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than FTC. Alternatively, the difference could be explained by the arguably higher standard of review DOJ receives compared with the
FTC regarding consent orders and complaints.115 Or, it could merely
reflect a difference in more formalistic conventions rather than a substantive difference in how these matters are analyzed. Any more definitive assessment of these data is beyond this scope of this Essay.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS REGARDING FURTHER GUIDANCE

Innovation is a critical issue for merger policy. Mergers can promote as well as harm innovation. Complaints and other public statements issued by the Antitrust Agencies generally focus on the likely
anticompetitive effects from a combination and rarely explain the reasons why they choose not to challenge a transaction, including possible efficiency defenses from innovation. However, it is this Essay's
view that the Agencies can provide greater transparency to antitrust
practitioners and the business community, and possibly sharpen their
analytical approach, if the Agencies describe their innovation concerns with greater specificity when merger challenges allege harm to
innovation.
The 2010 Guidelines constitute a valuable contribution to the
merger discourse regarding innovation but offer few details to describe the Antitrust Agencies' analytical processes in evaluating innovation concerns. This Essay's attempt to reverse engineer their
approach by examining actual enforcement actions in merger cases
reveals few consistent patterns. It is unavoidable that at any given
point the merger guidelines' content will invariably lag somewhat behind both the academic and practical insights drawn from the legal,
economics, and business fields, as well as actual Agency practices.
Scholarly research that posits a connection between competition and
incentives to innovate is complex and evolving. The empirical evidence is impressive but not entirely definitive. Nevertheless, there are
important themes that have withstood the test of time without contradiction from theory or empirics. Central among them is the importance of appropriation for incentivizing R&D.
The Guidelines note the significance of appropriation to the analysis of a merger's effects on the incentive to innovate, but more detail
about how each Agency undertakes such an evaluation is needed.
Providing such detail would better inform businesses and antitrust
115 See Todd N. Hutchison, Understanding the Differences Between the DOJ and the FTC,
AM. BAR Ass'N: 101 PRAC. SERIES, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/younglawyers/publications/the_101_201practice series/understandingdifferences.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2015).
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practitioners about the Agencies' enforcement practices and clarify
the Agencies' concerns about potential harms to innovation from
mergers and the scope for innovation-related merger efficiencies.

APPENDIX: INDUSTRY SECTOR

A.
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R&D

116

INTENSITY

High R&D Intensity
Aerospace products and parts
Architectural, engineering, and related services
Audio and video equipment
Chemicals
Communications equipment
Computer and electronic products
Computer systems design and related services
Data processing, hosting, and related services
Engines, turbines, and power transmission equipment
Genetically modified organisms**
Internet service providers and Web search portals
Medical equipment and supplies
Motor vehicles
Navigation, measurement, and control instruments
Other transportation equipment
(Patented) pharmaceuticals and medicines
Pesticides, fertilizers, and other agricultural chemicals
Professional, scientific, and technical services
Publishing
Semiconductors and other electronic components
Software publishers

B.

Moderate R&D Intensity
Aluminum production and processing
Basic chemicals
Clay products
Construction
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components
Health care services
Machinery
Magnetic and optical media
Management of companies and enterprises
Mining, extraction, and support activities
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Motor vehicle parts
Newspaper, periodical, book, and database
116 See MURO ET AL., supra note 77; NAT'L Sci. FOUND., supra note 77; see also text

accompanying notes 76-78.
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OTC drugs (low patent protection)**
Other chemicals
Other nonmanufacturing (family services)
Plastics and rubber products
Resin, synthetic rubber, fibers, and filament
Satellite telecommunications
Ship and boat building
Transportation equipment
C.

Low R&D Intensity
Beverage and tobacco products
Cable and other subscription programming
Concrete, sand and gravel**
Consumer nondurables**
Electric lighting equipment*
Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
Electrical equipment*
Fabricated metal products
Finance, insurance, and real estate***
Food
Foundries and fabricated metal products
Furniture and related products
Generic pharmaceuticals**
Household appliances*
Iron, steel, and ferroalloys
Media, broadcasting and entertainment**
Medical and diagnostic laboratories
Metal ore mining (and primary metals)
Managerial, scientific, and technical consulting
Miscellaneous services**
Motor vehicle bodies and trailers
Oil and gas extraction*
Oil and gas retailing, transport and storage**
Other nonmetallic mineral products
Outpatient medical services**
Paper, printing, and support activities
Petroleum and coal products*
Railroad rolling stock
Retail trade
Textiles, apparel, and leather
Transportation and warehousing
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Utilities
Wired and wireless (except satellite) telecommunications carriers
Wood products
Imputed from 3-digit NAICS by Brookings
** Category added to list without data
Category added despite data at 2-digit NAICS level
*

